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The aim of this thesis is to develop an analytical framework to model a large-scale
complex online advertising network. Due to the large increasing annual revenues of global
online advertising industry in recent years, agents’ behaviors in online advertising networks
have recently received attention as an important area of research. For this reason we decided
to purpose a framework, with the aim of identifying and investigating the agents’ (users,
advertisers) interaction and influence in the online advertising ecosystem.
This thesis first introduces the background and structure of online advertising ecosys-
tem. In a detailed central section the replicator-mutator (RM) dynamics of users’ and ad-
vertisers’ behaviors are proposed. Three adaptions to users’ RM dynamics for testing the
users’ behaviors are undertaken. Finally, the framework is applied to a real online ad-
vertising ecosystem, within a three-stage testing phase. At the end of each stage the RM
dynamics are fine-tuned, and experiment results are charted every stage.
The results of the experiment show that the analytical framework is well suited to
revealing the agents’ interaction and their allocating strategies. Specific analyses of two
advertisers are highlighted and two examples about targeting users are also explained. We
recommend further modification to the framework is to develop a numerical analysis model
that integrates advertisers’ critical stage.
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1.1 Background of Online Advertisement
Internet has undoubtedly become a major and effective medium for advertising, and
is likely to soon replace traditional advertising mediums such as television, newspapers
and magazines [10]. In every year since 2005, the annual growth rates of online advertis-
ing have exceeded those of other advertising media. Internet advertising has experienced
double-digit annual growth in every year except 2009; no other media has experienced this
growth in any year (please see Figure 1.1). Revenues in online advertising industry in the
U.S. hit landmark numbers at $9.6 billion during the first quarter of 2013, which is equal
to a 15.6% increase from the $8.3 billion reported during the first quarter of 2012 [24].
Annual revenues in the global online advertising industry are forecasted to reach an es-
timated $139.8 billion in 2018 with a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 7.3%
during the 2013-2018 period [30]. The inclination of users and advertisers towards the on-
line advertising systems stems from several facts. Firstly, users increasingly prefer to use
an online convenient purchase system rather than traveling to the real stores. Moreover,
they can access to valuable information such as full details of product as well as previous
1
Figure 1.1: Revenue trend of advertising market
users’ feedback via ratings and reviews which is not accessible via traditional shopping
methods. On the other hand, advertisers can effectively expand their brand influence and
credibility via the Internet’s tremendous popularity. They can also reduce the labor cost
through Internet sales. Finally, based on users’ behavior, advertisers are able to target and
to track potential users in order to evaluate the success of online advertising [23]. The latter
is important since it helps advertisers, and also those who have advertising opportunities
to sell, to target the users more effectively and efficiently through online or off-line feed-
backs [35]. They are a broad range of fascinating problems in the areas of market place
design for the mentioned interactions between the users and advertisers, trends/behavioral
targeting and performance optimization. However, only few works have looked into the
problem of the systematic modeling and analysis of such a network. Previous research in
this area are basically, i) targeting users, ii) bidding auctions. For example, to evaluate tar-
2
geting effectiveness of a targeted advertising campaign by using click through rate (CTR)
and to run a field experiment in the Yahoo! front page, a difference-in-difference estimator
is introduced in [16]. Based on two important characteristics of advertising, targeting and
noisy information content, the work in [13] builds a signaling model to distribute advertise-
ments to differentiated users by using targeting as a signal on product attributes. Bidding
auctions have also drawn much attention in recent years. In [39], the authors propose
a niche-based co-evolutionary simulation approach, aiming at computationally evaluating
Sponsored Search Advertising (SSA) auction mechanisms based on advertisers’ equilib-
rium bidding behaviors. The paper [35] models budget-constrained keywords bidding in
sponsored search auctions and designs an algorithm to solve the corresponding bidding
optimization problem.
The existing literature provides valuable insights in terms of the targeting and bid-
ding, there are almost no results concerning: the interaction of agents’ as well as important
model parameters. Although [29] gives a definition of competitiveness between two items
and evaluate it by finding the top-k competitors of a given item. Feedback controllers
in [27] learns from its mistakes and takes proper reactive and proactive actions to meet
advertisers’ goals. As a result, these models lack predictive power about how structures
emerge as the result of the interaction of individual rational agents. As an attempt to ad-
dress the problem, this thesis proposes a framework for modeling users and advertisers.
We derive this framework from replicator-mutator dynamics by adding agents’ interaction
with each other in online advertising ecosystem. While many important questions can
be addressed using this framework, here we only focus on the short-term interaction and
agents’ strategy design, which serve as a first step to more elaborate analysis in the future.
We then introduce the online advertising ecosystem where our framework will be applied
to. Next part online advertising ecosystem and replicator-mutator dynamics will be intro-
duced. Online advertising ecosystem is the place where our framework will be applied to
3
by using replicator-mutator dynamics to know the interaction of agents inside.
1.2 Online Advertising Ecosystem
In the following sections, structure of online advertising ecosystem and major agents
are highlighted. Typical advertisement types and pricing models used by online advertising
ecosystem are also introduced.
1.2.1 Ecosystem Structure
In this section, we introduce the structure of the online advertising ecosystem and
its key agents. A definition of the online advertising ecosystem is proposed here to de-
scribe a community of all the agents in conjunction with the relative components of their
environment (i.e., language and web page platforms). Generally, we can divide the agents
into four types: users, advertisers, publishers and ad exchanges. Agents in the ecosystem
interact with each other and evolve dynamically. For example, a user types the keywords
in the publisher’s search engine and does the comparison between advertisers’ products.
The publisher distributes advertisements to specific users based on users’ browsing histo-
ries and bidding results of different advertisers. The advertisers bid on locations in the
publisher’s website for product placement and brand promotion. Before proceeding to the
methodology, it is necessary to clarify some concepts and classify all the agents that com-
prise the online advertising ecosystem. We present the definition of the general view of
the online advertising system here using the ecosystem structure shown in Figure 1.2. The
characteristics of the four main agents in online advertising ecosystem are introduced in
the following part.
i) User: A user is the person who performs searching through search engines, browses
4
Figure 1.2: Structure of online advertising ecosystem
the web and consumes media content. Users may or may not acknowledge, view or
engage with advertisement in the process of performing these actions. While accessing
the online advertising, users will quickly disregard irrelevant information and focus on
searching other more relevant information [33]. Meanwhile, the interactive nature of
the Internet allows users to opt out of engaging with advertising altogether. Users are
separate centrals to online advertising ecosystem. Users are attracted and enticed by
advertisers to click and purchase the products on advertisements. The role that users
play in the whole system is unique and interconnected.
ii) Advertiser: Through advertisements, advertisers aim to trigger potential users’ de-
mand for a product or service. The advertisements can also be used to improve ad-
vertisers’ brand awareness by displaying advertisements. Depending on the budget
and investment environment, an advertiser can have its advertisements displayed on as
many websites as desired. Advertisers include various industries, e.g., New Balance
in sports shoes, iPhone in electronics and Estee Lauder in cosmetics. The most critical
5
tasks for advertisers in the online advertising ecosystem could be keywords selection
and bid optimization.
iii) Publisher: What realizes the interconnection of advertisers and users is the publisher.
Publishers reserve and sell impressions (spaces of their webpage) for branding or con-
textual advertisement in the form of contracts or the real-time bidding. A challenge for
publishers is to select the optimal contract or estimate the optimal price for advertise-
ment space. The publisher is responsible for delivering a total number of impressions,
i.e., webpages, based on what was agreed in the contract. The ultimate challenge for
publishers is to maximize their revenue. The most famous publishers are Google, eBay
and Amazon. For example, AdWords, created by Google [6]. The AdWords benefits
the advertisers by letting them to pay the price of the next highest bid instead of pay-
ing for the bid offered. It also provides the advertisers with “quality score” of different
users, so the advertisers can improve their bid outcomes. On the other hand, AdWords
benefits the users by providing with advertisements that are relevant to their needs.
Thus, it significantly saves the users’ time and eases the process of finding appropriate
product or information for them [38].
iv) Ad Exchanges: At the beginning phase of online advertising, advertisers can buy im-
pressions directly from publishers. However, as time passes, the numbers of both
advertisers and publishers vastly increase. This poses a need for an entity that can
connect and serve them. Ad exchanges are places like the stock exchanges. It bal-
ances the demands between advertisers and publishers. Ad exchanges also keep price
of advertisement between advertisers and publishers stable. Currently, Bing Ads by
Bing, Right Media by Yahoo! and DoubleClick by Google are the three giant groups
of Ad exchanges.
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As shown in Figure 1.2, users spend time reading advertisements and purchase products
from the advertisers. Advertisers estimate budgets to buy advertisement impressions from
Ad exchanges and publishers. Publishers sell advertisement impressions to advertisers
and Ad exchanges, also serve users. Ad exchanges serve as distributors or matchers for
advertisements and impressions.
1.2.2 Types of Online Advertisement
After knowing the basic agents, we next introduce different categories of online ad-
vertisement. Generally, we can categorize online advertisement into three types as follow:
i) Sponsored search advertisements: Sponsored searches, allow advertisers to buy cer-
tain keywords that exactly or broadly match queries submitted by users to promote
their business (please see Figure 1.3). Sponsored search engines act as publishers by
displaying advertisements alongside search results.
(a) Top advertisement (b) Side bar advertisement
Figure 1.3: Sponsored search advertisement in response to the keyword search “rental car”
ii) Branding advertisements: In this type of online advertisement, advertisers buy “im-
pressions” from publishers and have their advertisements displayed to all visitors
7
(please see Figure 1.4).
(a) Main advertisements (b) Side bar advertisements
Figure 1.4: Branding advertisement
iii) Contextual advertisements: Instead of displaying the same advertisement to every
user, this category shows different advertisements based on the geography, device,
language and other characteristics of users to maximize the utilization of advertising
opportunities. Figure 1.5 shows the universities’ advertisements with geography influ-
ence.
(a) Topper strip advertisements (b) Side bar advertisements
Figure 1.5: Contextual advertisements
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1.2.3 Types of Pricing Model
Based on trade-impression relationship between publishers and advertisers, all the
advertisement categories listed above contain different pricing models. Three typical mod-
els are as follow:
i) Cost-per-mille (CPM). Mille, which is Latin for “thousand”, refers to the price based
on 1,000 impressions. It is also known as cost-per-impression. Almost all publishers
prefer to bill on impressions because it is impression based, rather than performance
based. In other words, publishers risk nothing on advertising with impression based
CPM system and get paid for every impression; this is also the pricing standard for the
largest and most well-known publishers such as Casale Media and Conversant [4]. In
terms of overall cost, CPM priced media costs the advertisers the least among all the
pricing models.
ii) Cost-per-click (CPC). The cost-per-click (CPC) is the amount that advertisers pay
each time a user clicks on their advertisements. The CPC for any advertisement is
determined by the advertiser. Some advertisers may be willing to pay more per click





It is difficult for publishers to plan an impression demand for a target that uses multiple
publishers concurrently based on CPC pricing model. The most aversive characteristic
of this pricing model is that click-through-rate on an advertisement cannot be deter-
mined or tested by publishers beforehand. As we know, the CPC price increases when
click-through-rate decreases. Two advertisers with the same CPC rate might require
vastly different levels of impressions for the publisher to bill in full, and this uncer-
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tainty results in a high risk scenario for the publisher. For example, Google’s AdSense
is the largest CPC based clearing house used in the industry which attracts thousands
of advertisers. For the advertisers, CPC is a very low risk way to buy media because
they only have to pay for performance, resulting in some level of confidence in their
investment return.
iii) Cost-per-acquisition (CPA). Also known as cost per action, CPA is the best deal for
all advertisers in terms of risk because they only pay for media when their adver-
tisement results in a sale [2]. Using this pricing model, advertisers can choose the
publisher that is most likely to sell their product and allocate a portion of their pos-
sible profit to cover the advertisement costs. Similar to CPC pricing, this is usually
an awful deal for publishers. However, Affiliate Marketing Programs (AMP) [1] as
one of the advertisement network supervisors requires the publishers to follow a CPA
policy. This results in attracting publishers that are exclusively devoted to selling their
products via websites that are more advertorial than anything else.
1.3 Replicator-Mutator Dynamics
Replicator-Mutator Dynamics belong to evolutionary game theory [36] [20]. Evolu-
tionary game theory has proven itself to be invaluable in helping to explain many complex
and challenging aspects of biology. Different from classical game theory, evolutionary
game theory focuses more on the dynamics of strategy change as influenced not solely by
the quality of the various competing strategies but also by the effect of the frequency with
which those various competing strategies are found in the population. The replicator is the
central actor in an evolutionary system [19]. The replicator here can be a gene, an organism
(in the biology aspect), a belief, a technique, a strategy (in the social network aspect) or
some more general form having some means of making approximately accurate copies of
10
itself. A replicator system is a set of replicators in a particular environmental setting with
a structured pattern of interaction among agents. Meanwhile, evolutionary systems may
generate novelty if random errors (“mutations” or “perturbations”) occur in the replication
process, allowing new replicators to emerge and diffuse into the population if they are rel-
atively well adapted to the replicator system. The mutation parameter µ reflects a trait of
an individual. This trait describes how frequently the individual in question is willing to
change its mind. We first introduce the individual choice model of replicator-mutator dy-
namics based on [28]. First, we assume that there are n types, T1,T2, · · · ,Tn and all these
types undergo selection. The frequency of each type is expressed as x1,x2, · · · ,xn. The
reproduction rate of each type Ti, is determined by its fitness fi. Fitness is a function of all
frequencies which can be denoted by fi = Fi(x1,x2, · · · ,xn). Let Q ji be the probability that




Qi j = 1, 1 < i≤ n (1.1)
If we take a polynomial expansion of fitness in terms of xi and only keep the linear terms,
we obtain




a jixi + · · ·higher order terms, 1≤ j ≤ n. (1.2)
Here a ji are non-negative entries of an n×n matrix, and w j is the inhomogeneous part of












f jx j (1.4)
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is the average fitness of the population. For the simplicity, the fitness only includes homo-
geneous part. Then the general system (1.2) will be considered under the following mild
assumptions:
w j = f0, 1≤ i, j ≤ n, (1.5)
and
ai j = a ji, 0≤ ai j ≤ 1. (1.6)
Then social interaction of replicator-mutator dynamics is introduced based on [22] which
transitions from individual choice. The social interaction is modeled as a undirected graph,
G = (V,E), consisting of a set of vertices V , and a set of edges E. An edge ei j ∈ E connects
vertice vi ∈V with v j ∈V . Following the above assumptions, Equation (1.3) can be written
as
ẋk = (Qk)T Fkxk−φ kxk (1.7)
where k is the number of vertices V . The frequency of vertice xk is a vector expressed as
xk = [xk1,x
k
2, · · · ,xkn]. A row stochastic matrix W = [wi j] is the weighted interaction matrix





. Let f̄ j be the social fitness parameter associated with individual v j.
Note that we use a bar to differentiate social parameters from their individual counterparts.





f jwk j (1.8)
Therefore, φ̄ k is the weighted average social fitness of all individuals in the social network
with respect to individual vk. Then the individual replicator-mutator dynamic model with
12
the effects of social interaction can be expressed as




f̄ jwk jx j− φ̄ kxk, (1.9)
After adding the mutator part, the frequency of replicator-mutator dynamics will not only
be affected by each type’s reproduction, but also by perturbations occurring in the replica-
tion process. In our work, we adapt the replicator-mutator dynamics to model the online
advertising ecosystem where the interactions between users and advertisers follow a similar
pattern. New definitions of each parameter will be given.
1.4 Contribution
Currently, most research in the field of online advertising ecosystem focus mainly
on advertisement bidding auctions and revenue optimization from the economic and math-
ematical viewpoints. Most of their works remain mostly ad hoc and provide no insight
for advertisers’ smart investment. In other words, although they promise to model the
online advertising system, they still lack a systematic analytical framework to model the
large-scale complex network. In this thesis, we propose to take advantage of stochastic
models and evolutionary models to fulfill this need. Stochastic ordinary differential equa-
tions (ODEs) have been wildly used to model financial market. Meanwhile, evolutionary
dynamics have been successfully used to model the multi-agent networks. To integrate
these two modeling methods in the online advertising ecosystem we utilize the Replicator-
mutator (RM) dynamics. RM dynamics are a combination of tools from evolutionary dy-
namics of populations, complex networks, and control theory, which study the evolution
of the behavior of agents in social networks [18] [32]. The RM dynamics capture agents’
behaviors as they are affected by two parts: the willingness of agents and the influence
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from other agents. This is the first time the online advertising ecosystem is being defined
with the combination of economic and evolutionary interacting dynamics aspects. These
dynamic interactions in the social network can be used to model the dynamics of the on-
line advertising system, design predictable performance and advertisement strategy for the
online advertising ecosystem which is the main motivation of the proposed work. In this
thesis, we first model a large-scale complex online advertising ecosystem using an analyt-
ical framework. We then perform the model fitting for the proposed model using crawled
data from eBay. System-level performance analyses based on this analytical framework are
provided. Profitable strategies are also proposed here corresponding to the analysis.
1.5 Structure of Thesis
The organization of this thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, we first introduce users’
and advertisers’ RM dynamics. A toy problem including three different users’ dynamics
is also highlighted in this part. In Chapter 3, the effects of major parameters in users’ and
advertisers’ RM dynamics are simulated in Matlab. We then utilize crawled data of each
parameter from online shopping websites and normalize them into RM dynamics. To gain
a better idea of the online advertising ecosystem, we conduct a detailed analysis based on
the crawled data in Chapter 4. Some online advertisement strategies are also proposed.




In the existing works, replicator-mutator (RM) dynamics are used to model a social
choice system where there exists a rich set of evolutionary phases including emergence of a
single dominant behavioral trend, a few dominant behaviors, and lack of social norms [31].
As a preliminary study, and for the sake of simplicity, the online advertising ecosystem
defined in this chapter is a community of all kinds of agents including users, advertisers,
and an integrated publisher.
2.1 Problem Scenario
In our problem formation, we simplify the online advertising ecosystem introduced
in the first chapter and illustrate the simplified ecosystem in Figure 2.1. In this ecosystem,
we combine the ad exchanges and the publisher together, as one type of agent, which we
still call ”publisher” for the sake of simplicity. The role of publisher will not only host the
search engine website, but also organize the bidding results of all the advertisers. Some
real-life examples of this type of publisher are Double Click of “Google” and Right Me-





Figure 2.1: Relationship of users, advertisers, the integrated publisher and ad exchange in
the our model
“Adidas” and distribute advertisement to some specific users who like sports clothes. In
our model, the investment of each advertiser, i.e., how much they spend on the advertise-
ment in the publisher’s webpages, depends on their market forecast and variable revenues.
The bidding result of advertisers, i.e., the sequence of ranking places, is believed to have
a direct impact on users’ purchasing choices. Each advertiser represents a product. Users
initially have their own preferences between different advertisers. Normally the product
or advertiser appearing in the top of the search results list can attract a higher level of at-
traction. Therefore, advertisers would like to compete for the higher ranking place so as to
attract more users. In order to understand and analyze the trend of the online advertising
ecosystem, we here use RM dynamics to model the interaction between advertisers and
users. In this thesis, we take eBay as an example due to its unique mechanism. Publishers
such as “ eBay” have gained significant popularity recently. Users can find anything they
want by entering keywords in the search engine. Automatic product listings are then pro-
vided for users after a few seconds. In the following study, we ignore products with “sale”
marks and limited time bidding in eBay, focusing on only those items in the normal sale
condition. To better understand the scenario, let us consider a simple example. Assume
16
that the search engine provides users with the results of the keyword “camera”. Consider
n users. A user denoted as ru,u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} buying a camera from advertiser i is set
as having an allocation percentage of money xui . This element can also be viewed as the
purchase probability. At the same time, users who have brand loyalty for some products
can be modeled with a larger initial condition xui (0) in our ecosystem, such as “Nike” for
sports clothes, and “Apple” for computers. However, even if a brand has a good reputa-
tion, other factors can influence the final decision. For example, users might change their
minds for a lower price or higher quality of other similar matched products. Users can also
make better informed decisions by reading product reviews. Meanwhile, advertisers bid for
different advertisements’ ranking places in the publisher’s website. In the following parts,
the original RM dynamics introduced in Section 1.4 are applied and extended to model the
evolution of users and advertisers successively.
2.2 Evolutionary Dynamics for Users
We first list the main notations used in a user’s dynamics in Table 2.1. Let the users
network form a weighted graph Gr = (Vr,Er). A set of vertices Vr represent users ru,u ∈
{1,2, · · · ,n}. An edge ei j ∈ Er connects ri with r j, i, j ∈ {1, · · · ,n}. Similarly, we consider
a relational graph Gu = (V u,Eu) associating a user ru with a set of advertisers. Assume
each user is capable of searching for and comparing multiple advertisers simultaneously.
Let ρuv be strength between user ru and advertiser sv with ρuv = 1 if they have historical
transaction records and ρuv = 0 otherwise. The set of edges in graph Gu is given by
Eu = {(si,s j) : aui j(t)}, i, j ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N}. (2.1)
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Table 2.1: Notations used in user’s dynamics
User
Numbers of Users n
User Index ru
States of Percentage Allocation xu(t)
Strength of Links ρuv
Preference Matrix Au(t)
Component of Au(t) aui j
Diagonal Fitness Matrix Fu(t)
Fitness (of Agent i) fu(t)
Average Fitness φ u(t)
Mutation Matrix Qu(t)
Mutation Component qui j
Hierarchy Parameter λuv
Total Capacity αu(t)
Preference Potential dui (t)
Weighted Preference Matrix Wu(t)
Mutation Parameter µu
Define user ru’s preference matrix as
Au(t) = [aui j(t)], i, j ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N}, (2.2)
where element aui j(t) represents the preference of user ru for advertiser s j over si at time t.
Due to the effect of users’ own characteristics, local communications or relationships, users
have varying levels of preferences when comparing between advertisers. The element aui j
can also be viewed as the user’s prioritization of advertiser s j over si, and can be evaluated




2(t), · · · ,xuN(t)]T ∈ RN (2.3)
be a vector of allocation percentage of money of user ru to varying advertisers sv,v =
1,2, · · · ,N at time t. In other words, xuv represents the proportion of user ru’s purchase
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xui (t) = 1. (2.4)
The proof is explained in detail in Appendix B. Under this model, each user’s choices of
allocation percentage are used by the publisher to prioritize and target individual adver-
tisements. In the matrix form, user ru’s individual evolutionary replicator-mutator equation
with effects from advertisers can be written as










According to this model, user ru’s allocation percentage of money vector xu(t) updates
according to its own evaluation of different advertisers as well as the ranking places of
respective advertisers. Next, we explain each term in Equation 2.5 and their effects on the
evolution of user’s purchasing probability in sequence. For user ru, define the fitness by







j(t), i, j ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N}.
In the matrix form, the fitness vector associated with user ru for all N advertisers at time t
is given by
fu(t), Au(t)xu(t) ∈ RN . (2.6)
with the Fu(t) defined as
Fu(t) = diag[fu(t)]. (2.7)
19
Define the average fitness φ u(t) of user ru’s allocation to all advertisers at time t as
φ








Qu(t) = [qui j] (2.9)




qui j(t) = 1. (2.10)
The component qui j(t) is the likelihood that user ru reallocates its money from advertiser si
to advertiser s j, j 6= i, at time t. The choices for Qu(t) are consistent with [37], and related
to the preference matrix Au(t). Below, we briefly show a choice of Qu(t) based on [37].
Define the weighted preference matrix of Au as
Wu(t) = [wui j(t)], (2.11)









where matrix Du(t) = diag[du1 ,d
u
2 , · · · ,dun ] satisfies equation Wu(t) = (Du(t))−1Au(t). The




uwui j(t) i 6= j,
1−µu[1−wuii(t)] i = j.
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where µu ≥ 0 is the mutation parameter associated with user ru’s individual tendency to
change between advertisers. We also consider the effect of local interactions between users
in the same neighborhood network. Therefore, let us associate a parameter λuv > 0 with
each user ru that describes the effects of unique hierarchy of the individual user. This
parameter indicates how effective user ru is in propagating his/her allocation percentage of
money in different advertisers’ products to other users. The parameter β v(t) is introduced








where ρuv is the strength link parameter which describes the strength of users’ influence on
each other.
2.3 Evolutionary Dynamics for Advertisers
Similar as Table 2.1, Table 2.2 lists all the parameters used in advertisers’ RM
dynamics. Consider an advertiser network that forms a weighted graph Ḡs = (V̄s, Ēs). A
set of vertices V̄s are advertisers sv,v ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N} with edges ēi j ∈ Ēs connecting si
with s j. We also consider a relational graph Ḡv = (V̄ v, Ēv) associated with advertiser sv
with a set of nodes representing ranking places Ri, i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,M} in the publisher’s
webpage. Assume that each advertiser is capable of bidding for multiple ranking places
simultaneously. Define a preference matrix for the advertisers.
Āv(t) = [āvi j(t)], i, j ∈ {1,2, · · · ,M}. (2.13)
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Strength Of Links ξvl
Preference Matrix Āv(t)
Preference Component āvi j
Diagonal Fitness Matrix Hv(t)
Fitness (of Agent i) hv(t)
Average Fitness θ v(t)
Mutation Matrix Pv(t)
Mutation Component pi j
Hierarchy Parameter γvl
Total Capacity β v(t)
Preference Potential bvi (t)
Weighted Preference Matrix Mv(t)
Mutation Parameter µ̄v
and a set of edges in graph Ḡv given by
Ēv = {(Ri,R j) : āvi j}. (2.14)
The matrix element āvi j represents the preference advertiser sv has for ranking place R j
over Ri. It can also be viewed as the prioritization of advertiser R j over Ri evaluated by
the publisher based on advertisers’ bidding price and brand image. Note that the matrix
Āv(t) can be time-varying. Let
yv(t) = [yv1(t),y
v
2(t), · · · ,yvM(t)]T ∈ RM (2.15)
be a vector of allocation percentage of advertiser sv to ranking places
R = {R1,R2, · · · ,RM} (2.16)
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at time t. In the other words, yvi represents the percentage of budget that advertiser sv
allocates to ranking place Ri. Setting the total budget of advertiser sv equal to 1, we have
cTyv(t) = 1, where c = (1,1, · · · ,1)T ∈ RN . The proof is explained in detail in Appendix








j(t), i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,M}.
In the matrix form, the fitness vector of advertiser sv associated with ranking places in R
at time t can be given as
(hv(t))T = Āv(t)yv(t) ∈ RM. (2.17)
Let
Hv(t) = diag[hv(t)]. (2.18)
Define
θ







as the average fitness of advertiser sv via allocation of all the ranking place Ri, i∈{1,2, · · · ,M}.
Let
Pv(t) = [pvi j] (2.20)
be the mutation matrix associated with advertiser sv, which is a row stochastic matrix satis-
fying ∑Mj=1 p
v
i j(t) = 1. The component p
v
i j(t) is the likelihood that advertiser sv reallocates
its budgets from ranking place R j to advertiser Ri ( j 6= i) at time t. Similarly, we choose
Pv(t) using preference matrix Āv(t) [37]. Define the weighted preference matrix of Ḡs as







At the same time, define the matrix











vMvi j(t) i 6= j,
1− µ̄v[1−Mvii(t)] i = j.
(2.24)
where µ̄v ≥ 0 is the mutation parameter associated with advertiser sv’s individual tendency
to change between ranking places. Now we consider the effect of interaction between
advertisers in the same online advertising ecosystem. Associate a parameter γvl > 0 with
each advertiser sv to describe the hierarchy and/or capability differences of the advertiser.







where ξvl is the strength link parameter which describes the strength of advertisers’ influ-




| (i 6= j) (2.26)
Therefore, β v(t) is the weighted average social fitness of all advertisers in the social net-
work with respect to advertiser sv, where the weighting is given by the components of the
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weighted interaction matrix Mv(t). The dynamics of advertiser sv can be written as





Under this model, we assume all advertisers have the same budget. The advertiser’s choice
of allocating how much percentage of its budget to bid on a certain ranking place is es-
sentially based on the requirement of enterprise operation as well as the effects of other
advertisers, i.e., the advertising market estimation and the actual competitiveness. In the
matrix form, the advertisers’ individual-based evolutionary replicator-mutator equation can
be written as equation (2.27). Here we can set the publisher as a leader which has the same
dynamics as an advertiser; however, it can largely affect other advertisers’ bidding deci-
sions. According to advertisers’ model, yv(t) updates according to their individual revenue
as well as the effects of other advertisers (including publishers).
2.3.1 Ecosystem Performance
Let us consider an online ecosystem of 100 users choosing among 2 advertisers
with random initial allocation xu(0) and preference matrix Aui j,u∈ {1,2, . . . ,100} and i, j ∈
{1,2}. This implies users have random preference about all advertisers before they choose
and make a purchase. We only consider users’ dynamics here and assume that advertiser 1
stays at a better advertising ranking place in the website.
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Figure 2.2: Allocation ratio of user ru,u = 1, · · · ,100, for advertiser s1 and s2 in the on-
line advertisting ecosystem. Users prefer advertiser 1 instead of advertiser 2 based on the
following setting parameters: random initial condition state x1(0) ∈ [0,1], x2(0) ∈ [0,1];
preference element au12 > a
u
21 in users’ preference matrix A
u with small different numerical
values of mutation parameter.
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the state of allocation percentage of each user for
advertiser s1 and advertiser s2. Each user in Figure 2.2 has different initial allocation to
advertiser 1 and advertiser 2. A dominant allocation is achieved after 1.9 time units due to
the choice of relatively small mutation parameters qi j. It is obvious from the figure that xu1
> xu2,u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,100} showing most of the users will spend much more time and money
on advertiser 1, which is consistent with our assumption that upper or better ranking places
will attract more users. The specific Matlab data here also verify ∑Ni=1 x
u
i (t) = 1, which the
total money of individual user ru equal to 1.
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2.4 Toy Problem
To give a clearer picture, we start with a toy example to see how the proposed dy-
namic equation (2.5) and (2.27) model the online advertising ecosystem. In this section, we
will present three special cases to see how RM dynamics work between users and adver-
tisers. We assume that all the advertisers have the same budget for bidding ranking places.
Meanwhile, all the users have same amount of money for choosing different advertisers’
products. The prices and bidding ranking are based on advertisers’ own business strategies.
Real market examples will also be given under each case.
2.4.1 Replicator Dynamics: Users’ Own Belief and Preferences
As explained above in the dynamics section, the belief of users or their own pref-
erence is modeled by the first two terms of replicator-mutator dynamics. Each user has its
own judgment and preference to different advertisers. In this case, we will prove that the
advertisers’ ranking places do not affect users’ choices. Following the above assumption,
equation (2.5) reduces to
ẋu(t) = [Qu(t)]T Fu(t)xu(t)−φ u(t)xu(t), u = 1, . . . ,n
means the evolution of xu(t) is solely dependent on its own belief and preference, i.e., the
term aui j in the preference matrix A
u. The users here can be represented for a group of
people who have the same preference to a certain product or advertiser; they will achieve




In this section, we simulate an ecosystem of 3 users and 3 advertisers. We assume










































































































Figure 2.3: Users’ belief: Allocation ratio of advertisers with bidding results from 1st to
3rd ranking place: Advertiser 2, Advertiser 1, Advertiser 3 based only on users’ belief and
preference.
Advertiser s2 obtains the 1st ranking place R1, advertiser s1 obtains the 2nd ranking
place R2, and advertiser s3 obtains the 3rd ranking place R3. At the same time, we assume
that users all have a preference to advertiser s1 instead of s2 and s3. According to users’
dynamics that users’ allocation percentage only affect by users’ own beliefs and prefer-
ences, we can find the allocation of users to advertiser 1 is much larger than advertiser 2
and advertiser 3 in Figure 2.4. It is obvious that advertisers’ ranking places have no effects






































































Figure 2.4: Users’ belief: Allocation ratio of 100 users who have the similar individual
preference (preference matrix) to the 1st advertiser.
2.4.2 Mutator Dynamics: Advertisers’ Influence
We now study the contribution of interaction element ρuv to the evolution of xu(t)
under this scenario. For the sake of comparison, each user is assumed to have a same hier-
archy parameter γuv,u = 1,2, . . . ,n to all advertisers sv,v = 1,2,3. Therefore, no user in the
network will have stronger influence than others. The preference element aui j for each user
is also set to be the same, hence, each advertiser’s product has the same probability to be
chosen by users. Following the assumption that the dynamics only include the advertisers’











As is shown in Figure 2.6, the evolution of xu(t) is solely dependent on advertisers’ ranking







































































































(it loses the bidding for
1st ranking place)
Figure 2.5: Advertisers’ influence: Allocation ratio of advertisers with bidding result from
1st to 3rd ranking place: Advertiser 2, Advertiser 1, Advertiser 3.
Advertiser s2 holds a better place than advertiser s1 which means that advertiser s2 can
attract more users than advertiser s1. From Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6, we can find that
the advertisers’ ranking places have a large effect on users’ choices. Users will naturally
choose the advertiser who holds the best ranking place.
2.4.3 RM dynamics: Individual Preferences and Social Interactions
Combining users’ beliefs and preferences (first two terms in Equation (2.5)) with
interaction with advertisers (last two terms in Equation (2.5)), the full RM dynamics show
the trend of the percentage allocation of the users’ budgets. In this case, the sequence of
advertisers’ ranking places is similar with previous two cases. In Figure 2.7, advertiser 2
is in the 1st ranking place, then advertiser 1 and advertiser 3. However, the users’ results



















































































Figure 2.6: Advertisers’ influence: Allocation ratio of users who have no preference to any


































































































1st ranking place Advertiser 1 in
2nd ranking place Advertiser 3 in
3rd ranking place

















































































Most of users prefer
the 1st ranking 
place: advertiser 2
Figure 2.8: RM dynamic: Allocation ratio of users to the different advertisers.
cate most of their resources to advertiser 2 s2 who holds the 1st ranking R1. The results
were concordant with our assumption. Secondly, users have various allocations to different
advertisers this time instead of having the same allocation consistently due to interactions.
32
Chapter 3
Data Crawling And Model Validation
Crawl data, means extracting data from certain webpages. It is not easy to crawl
data for online advertising networks. Firstly, the large amount of users in the network can-
not simply be divided into several types in regards to geography, language, device and other
characteristics of users. The reason why we want to do this, however, is because we want to
chase the trend of a group of people to target potential users. What are their responses with
regards to different products? Which kind of products will they be particularly interested
in? Secondly, websites in the online advertising ecosystem have high security systems that
protect all the users’ personal data as well as the websites’ operating information. As we
know, a website’s operators protect all their users’ documents and information, including
the purchase history and related products or advertisers by certain contracts.
Google Adwords, as a branch of the Google empire business, focuses on advertise-
ment. It shares the users’ information from the Google data base. However, others do not
have easy access to this data base. User who has a Google account is more likely to receive
more advertisement or other information than others. For instance, after deciding to buy a
new tablet online, a simple scene could be drawn as follows. You first open two or three
online electronics websites, and type keywords into the search box. Then you consider
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waiting for a couple of days for potential price drops after selecting and comparing prod-
ucts with each other. In the following days, advertisements of the tablet you have reviewed
will begin to show up in different web pages with the format of small floating windows.
You cannot avoid taking a peek at them consciously when browsing the main text. It acts as
a reminder that you can easily click the window to go back the product’s page immediately
and make a purchase. It not only promotes brand, but also stimulates market consump-
tion. However, the interesting notation here is how the advertisers know what product the
users want to buy and distribute the exact advertisement for them. Currently, a large part
of the advertising industry is self-regulated and still follows the guidelines set out by the
Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) [7].
Last but not least, another difficulty of collecting data is the hundreds of thousands
of products and categories to select. Products that could be used in our work, however,
should at least contain two characteristics. The first characteristic is the appropriate amount
of sales. We cannot choose cameras like Canon D60, or Nikon 7000D whose price is
relatively high for ordinary people to buy several times within a short time. The sales
volume of these products do not have an obvious change in order to give us a price trend
of the product and preference of users. Therefore, it is hard to collect data of purchasing
behavior for such products. On contrary, we cannot choose products with a huge amount of
sales volume, like iPhone cases, due to their indifference in brand influence. It is obvious
that users seldom have preference for iPhone case’s brand. Thus, the other characteristic
products should have is brand influence. The product’s brand should be well known with a
great number of people being familiar with the brand and its products or, even being loyal
fans.
After long observation and discussion, the category we decided to focus on is a new
technological product — the tablet that has shown to have a suitable price range and sales
volume with brands frame. We assume that advertisers are maximizing their profits with
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respect to the information available to them. The rest of the sections will first introduce
the basic effect of major parameters in RM dynamics with Matlab simulation results. Fur-
thermore, the method of data crawling used is introduced, and detailed data and simulation
results are listed.
3.1 Four Main Parameters in RM Dynamics
We introduce four major parameters, namely the hierarchy parameter, the prefer-
ence matrix, the initial condition, and the mutation matrix in users’ and advertisers’ dy-
namics. Furthermore, by analyzing and discussing the related market applications, we can
aggregate the fundamental problems and capture potential prospects.
3.1.1 Users’ Performance Under Different Task Priorities
In the following sections, we will consider users’ behaviors and effects under the
environment of eBay. Each parameter in the users’ dynamics plays a unique role which
formulates users’ performance in real online market as eBay. Figure 3.1 gives an example
of ratings and comments of an online retailer. In the common sense, users prefer to purchase
products which have large amount of positive comments and higher ratings. From Figure
3.1, we can easily find the most helpful favorable review in the certain category. There are
some keywords in the product feature that make it easier for users to find the products they
want. What’s more, the rating evaluation system is visualized; users can get a brief idea
about the product’s rating at a glance. The reviews from previous users give a more detailed
story about the product. Some of them would attract more users to make a purchase, others
on the contrary.
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Figure 3.1: Product’s ratings and comments given by the users in Amazon.
3.1.1.1 Variation of Hierarchy Parameter
Let us first consider a system with various values of users’ hierarchy parameter λuv.
The value of hierarchy parameter λuv depends on the users’ influence on others for all the
products that online advertisers provide. For example, users usually leave comments for
the products after purchasing and using. Others will judge these comments whether to be
helpful. The more users accept the comments, the larger value of hierarchy parameter users
will have for the products. Users with a higher hierarchy parameter are easier to influence
other users. These special users will have the ability of affecting more users, no matter
positive or negative comments they leave.
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Simulation Results
In this section, we simulate an ecosystem of 4 users choosing between 2 advertisers.
The hierarchy parameter of 4 users can be presented as the rating star or comments that a
user gives to the advertiser’s product. Higher rating star or positive comment would be
more attractive and persuasive; they have more a powerful influence than others, very low
























































 changes from 1 to 30
Figure 3.2: Final allocation ratio of each user ru,u = 1, · · · ,4 to advertiser s1 in the on-
line advertising ecosystem. Each user has a different hierarchy parameters λ2 = 1.0,λ3 =
2.0,λ4 = 3.0. All users have the same initial condition, preference matrix and mutation
parameter.
rating will have powerful influence as well. We assume that user r1 always chooses
advertiser s1. By only increasing hierarchy parameter of user r1, λ1 from 1 to 30, the
percentage allocation of users r2, r3, and r4 for advertiser s1 will correspondingly increase.
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The hierarchy parameter of user r2, r3 and r4 have been chosen to satisfy λ2+λ3+λ4 λ1.
The user with the higher hierarchy can be regarded as the leader in the network with the
others as followers. If user λ1 tends to allocate more money to advertiser s1, users r2, r3




1(t), which is consistent
with our prediction. Note that the propagation of a user’s percentage ratio of money still
depends on ξvl , its local connectedness with other users in the ecosystem. Figure 3.2 shows
the final allocation of users’ money for advertisers in the online advertising ecosystem
corresponding to changes in user r1’s hierarchy parameter.
Related Market Implication
We assume that users have the same impression for products with the same initial
condition. At the same time, users will not easily change their initial choice. Users with
larger hierarchy parameter are identified as public figures which have greater influence.
Other users will think about these figures’ choice and tend to make a similar decision. We
donate user r1 as a public figure. From Fig 3.2, the larger the gap between λ1 and λ2+λ3+λ4,
the other users tend more to change their minds to follow r1 and finally adopt r1’s choice.
3.1.1.2 Variation of Preference Matrix
We now consider the effect of the preference matrix Au in the ecosystem of 4 users
choosing between 2 advertisers. With the increasing value of element ai j in the preference
matrices of users ru,u = 1, · · · ,4 to advertiser s1, the percentage allocation of all users to
advertiser 1 is expected to increase by the time.
Simulation Results
The same preference element in a specific matrix Au means that the price of these
advertisers’ products is same. For example, if product j has a lower price than i or its
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shipment fee is free, the preference element aui j is larger in the dynamics. The preference
element aui j here can be understood as the users’ preference of one product j over i. This is
intuitive because a user will be happier to purchase the same product at a lower price.










































Figure 3.3: Final allocation ratio of each user ru,u= 1, · · · ,4 to advertiser s1 over advertiser





12 from 5 to 40. All users have the same initial condition, hierarchy parameter
and mutation parameter.
Figure 3.3 shows the simulation results. It is obvious from the figure that by in-
creasing the preference element of all users to advertiser 1, the percentage of their money
allocation will correspondingly increase. In other words, products with a lower price at-
tract more users than the same products with a higher price. Another interesting result we
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observe from Figure 3.3 is that by increasing au1 j, the value of the preference element cor-
responding to the preference of users to advertiser 1, the slope of the allocation evolution
also increase. Users become more likely to choose advertiser 1 to make a purchase.
Related Market Implication
Assume that users have the same impression for products with the same initial con-
dition. Meanwhile, they give the same ratings for all products so that choices will not be
affected by other users. Users with larger element aui j in the preference matrix will choose
the product j with a lower price over i. The lower price, as we describe at the beginning of
this section may be caused by the shipment fee exclusion, membership discount or coupon.
Generally, user would like to purchase the product offered by the advertiser that offers
lower prices.
3.1.1.3 Variation of Initial Conditions
We now consider the case that 4 users have different initial allocation conditions
xi(0), i = 1, · · · ,4 towards choosing between 2 advertisers. Having the same initial condi-
tion xi(0) implies that users have the same impression or belief to advertiser s1 and adver-
tiser s2 at first. That is to say, these users have the same probability to purchase from these
two advertisers before they know the price and review rating history. Some of them could
have a better belief on, or even be loyal to a certain brand. All these factors may affect their
final decisions.
Simulation Results
As shown in Figure 3.4, by increasing the initial allocation ratio of all users to
advertiser s1, the allocation ratio to advertiser s1 goes up accordingly. For example, user r1
with initial value x1(0) = 0.2 has the final allocation state x11 = 0.65. If, user r1 has initial
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condition x1(0) = 0.6, it will reach final allocation state x11 = 0.79. The latter represents a
loyal user who owns allegiance to the brand or has purchased from this advertiser before.




















































Figure 3.4: Final allocation ratio of each user ru,u = 1, · · · ,4 for advertiser s1 in the online
advertising ecosystem with different initial conditions.
Related Market Implication
Assume that users can search all products of the same price and same ratings. The
user ru with larger initial condition xu(0) would more likely to purchase product i by ad-
vertiser si than other users. Under this situation, there is a larger probability for advertisers
to sell products by targeting the specific users instead of common people.
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3.1.1.4 Variation of Mutation Matrix
Here we consider the influence of the mutation parameter µu on users’ dynamics.
This parameter implies how easily a user tends to change between different advertisers.
With the value of mutation parameter lying in certain range, the conclusion — users with
larger value of mutation parameter will be more prompt to change their decisions — can
be made. That is to say, initial choice will be changed after a shorter comparison.
Simulation Results
In this section, we simulate an ecosystem of 4 users and 2 advertisers. By changing
users’ preference matrix with given values of mutation parameter µu=1 and µu=10, we can
gain a brief idea about the effects of the mutation parameter. By comparing Figure 3.5a and
3.5b, the slope, i.e., how rapidly the final effect of the user changes with respect to a change
in preference, is greater when µu=10. However, when preference element becomes large
enough, around 20∼25, the changes of final state of ru,u = 1, · · · ,4 are very small. This
observation is consistent with the previous assumption in the last section, i.e., a user who
has strong willingness to buy a certain product with a low value of the mutation parameter,
won’t change his/her mind easily.
Related Market Implication
We assume that if users have the same mutation parameter, they have the same
tendency of changing minds between different advertisers. On contrary, the mutative speed
of users who have the larger mutation parameter is faster. It is equal to say, users will
change minds frequently between products of the similar quality and appearance. Under
this condition, they have a lower probability to purchase certain products.
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(a) µu = 1,u = 1,2,3,4.













































(b) µu = 10,u = 1,2,3,4.
Figure 3.5: Final allocation ratio of each user ru,u = 1, · · · ,4 for advertiser s1 in the online
advertising ecosystem with changing users’ preference element of advertiser 1 from 3 to
30.
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3.1.2 Advertisers’ Performance Under Different Task Priorities
In the following part, four major parameters of advertisers’ dynamics will be dis-
cussed and shown with Matlab simulation results.
3.1.2.1 Variation of Advertisers’ Hierarchy Parameter
In this section, we consider advertisers with different hierarchy parameter γvl . Hav-
ing the same hierarchy parameter amongst the advertisers implies that all advertisers choose
the same ranking place to display their advertisements. On the contrary, advertisers with
different hierarchy parameters will choose the best matched ranking place. For example,
the shoe brand Nike will be more likely to put advertisements either in Amazon or 6PM
(6PM is an online sales website focusing on shoes) instead of Target because most of the
users prefer buy “Nike” shoes in the specific stores. Advertisements will be distributed
to each website with different estimated budgets. Advertisers will allocate resources in-
dependently by their own choosing to compete for each ranking place. The total resource
percentage of an advertiser to ranking places should be 1.
3.1.2.2 Variation of Advertisers’ Preference Matrix
For advertisers who have the same advertising volume with a lower price or higher
quality, they can attract more users and have a bigger preference element for the certain
ranking places. Products are provided by different advertisers within various prices. Pub-
lisher will provide a better position for an advertiser offering higher price.
Simulation Results
In this section, we consider a case of 2 advertisers bidding between 2 ranking places
with a changing value of the preference matrix of advertiser s1 and advertiser s2 to the 2nd
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ranking place R2.
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Figure 3.6: Final allocation ratio for advertiser s1 and s2 to 2nd ranking place in the online
advertising ecosystem with different preference matrices. Increasing the preference ele-
ment of advertiser 1 towards 2nd ranking place over 1st ranking place from 1 to 15, i.e.,
au12 ∈ [1,15].
From Figure 3.6, it is obvious that with the increasing value of the preference ele-
ment to the second ranking place, the allocation of resources of advertiser 1 and advertiser
2 to the second ranking place R2 increases smoothly and eventually overtakes allocation
toward R1.
Related Market Implications
We assume advertisers with different preference matrices will be treated differently
by the publisher. The bigger preference element an advertiser has, the larger probability it
will obtain the upper ranking place. In general, we assume that big enterprises which have
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a long term relationship with an online retailer will have a bigger preference element.
3.1.2.3 Variation of Initial Condition
Each advertiser has its own budget for different ranking places of a publisher’s
webpage. Having the same initial condition of advertisers yv(0) implies that each adver-
tiser plans to distribute the same percentage to bid for those ranking places R initially.
However, the real bidding process will keep changing over time due to the effects of the
other advertisers’ behavior.
Simulation Results
In this section, we consider a case of 2 advertisers bidding between 2 ranking places
with different initial condition y1(0) and y2(0). The final percentage allocations of adver-
tiser s1 and s2 all converge to the same percentage of allocation regardless of the changes
in initial condition (as seen in Figures 3.7 and 3.8). Note that state yv1 is the allocation
of advertisers sv (v = 1,2) to R1 and state yv2 is the allocation of advertisers sv (v = 1,2)









rately represent advertiser 1 and 2’s initial percentage allocation to the 1st and 2nd ranking









. In the simulation, we assume that both advertiser 1 and advertiser 2
have preference to the upper advertising place (1st ranking place). However, advertiser 1
has a larger preference element than advertiser 2. Based on Figure 3.8, the final percentage
of advertiser 1 to 1st and 2nd ranking place are y11 = 0.21 and y
1
2 = 0.79. At the same time,
y21 = 0.605 and y
2




1, advertiser 2 will successfully obtain the upper
location.
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Figure 3.7: Allocation ratio for advertiser s1 and s2 in the online advertising ecosystem
with initial condition y1(0) = [0.1 0.9],y2(0) = [0.9 0.1].
Related Market Implication
In the real market, advertisers will collect information about different online retail-
ers and make an initial choice for themselves before the real bidding. However, advertisers’
choices are affected by other reasons such as click numbers and purchase history of users
or low prices to ranking places by publishers.
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Figure 3.8: Allocation ratio for advertiser s1 and s2 in the online advertising ecosystem
with initial condition y1(0) = [0.5 0.5],y2(0) = [0.5 0.5].
3.1.3 Variation of Mutation Parameter
The mutation parameter µ̄v reflects how easily an advertiser tends to change be-
tween different ranking places. Advertisers with larger values of the mutation parameters
will tend to change their budget distribution and advertisement places more rapidly.
Simulation Results
In this section, we consider a case of 2 advertisers bidding between 2 ranking places
with different mutation parameters µ̄1 and µ̄2. We assume that both advertisers naturally
choose the 1st ranking place. At the same time, we notice that when the mutation value
is large enough, the percentage allocation towards the second ranking place increases at
a slower rate which verifies the intuition that no advertiser will change its allocation of
resources unboundedly. Advertiser s1 has a slightly larger preference element of ranking
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place R2 than advertiser s2. That is to say, advertiser s1 will grow more quickly and have a
larger final allocation towards R2 than advertiser s2. From Figure 3.9, when the advertisers’
mutation parameters increase, we observe that the final states of both advertiser s1 and
advertiser s2 to 2nd ranking place R2 increases. The simulation result is also consistent
with the real market situation.













































Figure 3.9: Final allocation ratio for advertiser s1 and s2 in the online advertising ecosystem
with changing values of mutation parameter to second ranking place.
Related Market Implications
In the real market, how often an advertiser will change his/her percentage allocation
largely depends on the market information collected. Research about the whole market will
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help advertisers choose a stable and profitable publisher and a suitable ranking place. In
the general case, they should have a low mutation value. In that way, they will not change
their minds frequently, which results in wasted resources.
3.2 Data Crawling Method
After knowing how major parameters affect the users’ and advertisers’ RM dynam-
ics, there are three parameters for users and advertisers we need to extract from the real
market. They are hierarchy parameter, preference component and strength of links of
the user and the advertiser. As we discussed in the previous section, each parameter has
different effects on the dynamics. Meanwhile, each parameter represents a unique mean-
ing in the online advertising ecosystem. In this section, data crawled from the real online
advertising market are adopted into our RM dynamics to verify our model.
3.2.1 User’s Data
• Hierarchy Parameter λuv. The hierarchy parameter reflects a user’s own influ-
ence. For this parameter, we crawl data that can reflect the relationship between users
in eBay. Alongside, the rating star and comments from the users who have bought
products, eBay also encourages users to give their opinion of each specific comment
(see Figure 3.10). For each comment we can get the number of users who regard the
comment helpful and useful. User comments with larger certifying numbers or more
recognition will have a bigger hierarchy parameter value due to their larger impact
on others.
• Preference component aui j. The preference component reflects users’ attitude
towards an advertiser. We collect users’ rating history from the selected advertisers.
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(a) Top product reviews (b) Bottom product reviews
Figure 3.10: Review and comment left by users
Based on the rating system setting in eBay, some users leave comments and rating
stars for the advertiser that they just bought products from in order to enhance their
degree of integrity. Our calculation of the value of aui j (users of a certain advertiser)
is mainly depending on these rating stars. User ru who leaves 4 stars and above will
be assumed to have a larger preference value. 2 stars and below are set as negative
feedback and correspond to the smaller preference value. 3 stars are treated as neutral
feedback. Figure 3.11 is a real user’s profile in eBay. The number of positive, neutral
and negative feedback ratings of this user can be found in the bottom left of Figure
3.11.
• Strength of Links ρuv. The strength of links represents the relationship between
users and advertisers. The value depends on whether a user has previously bought a
certain product from an advertiser. We assume that if user ru has purchased a product
from this advertiser sv’s before, then in the definition of graph theory for multi-agent
social network [15], the user ru and advertiser sv connect with each other in the
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Figure 3.11: Numbers of feedback rating given by users to the certain advertiser
following way:
ρuv =
 1 if user ru purchased product from advertiser sv,0 otherwise. (3.1)
3.2.2 Advertisers’ Data
• Hierarchy parameter γvl . Websites like Forbes [5] and Toptenreviews [12] give
us the overall scenario about brand ranking in each category. We give a value be-
tween zero and one to each advertiser approximately based on those rankings as a
representation of their influence. For example, a ranking of the world’s top technol-
ogy brands reveals that Apple is the most valuable name in its respective category.
The growth and profit generated by Apple’s intangible assets, such as its globally
recognizable logo, is nearly double than other major technology brands. Figure 3.12
shows an example of the 2014 tablet brand ranking from Toptenview’ website.
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Figure 3.12: 2014 Tablet Ranking and Comparison
• Preference Component avi j. This parameter reflects advertisers’ preference to
different locations or ranking places. We collect numbers of products sold and their
ranking place changes in a period of time to measure this component. The sale
volume of this product increases simultaneously when the position or ranking place
rises. Otherwise, they both drop. The frequency of place changing of each advertiser
corresponds to changes in sales volume. The following figures show the relationship
between sales volume and ranking places from the data we have crawled. Figure 3.13
shows the changes of ranking place versus time. Figure 3.14 shows the variation of




























































































































































































































Figure 3.14: Change of sales volume from Feb 28th to March 18th
Figure 3.15 provides a general comparison of four advertisers, namely Apple, Kindle,
Samsung, and Asus. From Figure 3.13, the evolutionary state of four brands or
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advertisers can be divided into four stages with each stage described in detail for
the four advertisers below.
 Apple. The Apple tablet has the lowest ranking place during the first stage
from Feb 28th to Mar 4th. However, its gap with others is quickly decreasing
by the end of this stage. Combined with the Figures 3.13 and 3.14, it is obvious
to see that while the ranking is rising, the sale volume is increasing. During
the second stage, Apple obtains the first ranking place by changing the strategy
used in the first stage. The increase in sales volume is steady and smooth. The
battle between all these advertisers reaches the heat of the moment. Although
the final ranking place of Apple is the third one, its sales volume is the largest.
 Kindle. Kindle has the smallest frequency of change and keeps its ranking
place in a suitable range during the whole time period. In the beginning, Kindle
makes itself in the second ranking place. At the beginning of the second stage,
Kindle falls to the 3rd ranking place. The reason could be from two parts,
strategy and competition. Kindle does not change its bidding strategy when
other competitors start to adjust their strategies for a better sales volume. At
the middle of the second stage, after realizing that its place is under the strong
threat, Kindle still holds the same strategy and let itself fall down to the last
ranking place.
 Samsung. Samsung holds the highest ranking place during the first stage, and
correspondingly gains largest initial sales volume. It then falls to the fourth
ranking place during the second stage. From the perspective of Samsung, rea-
sons for these changes might be loss of profit or competition from others. At
the end of the second stage, Samsung tries regain back to the top ranking place.
By doing so, its sales volume relatively increased.
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 Asus. The frequency of Asus changes frequently during the time period. Being
at the third ranking place, Asus always wants to gain a higher place to increase
its sales volume. After a hard struggle with the other advertisers, Asus keeps
its third ranking place. Additionally, Figure 3.14 shows the distinct increasing
volume of Apple sales, which corresponds to the rising ranking place. There
are more interesting results that can be found from Figure 3.15. The plot in the
left bottom tells the same story between sales volumes and ranking places of
Apple. The sales volumes of other three brands are in the range of 0 to 150.










































































Figure 3.15: Relationship between sales volume and ranking place changes from Feb 28th
to March 18th.
• Strength of Links ξvl . The strength of links ξvl represents the connectedness
between different advertisers. The advertisers bid with each other for a suitable loca-
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tions or ranking places in the webpage to promote brand or to sell products. There-
fore, their locations or ranking places will change with time due to sales volume
and other reasons. We therefore assume that the difference between two advertisers’





| ( j 6= i). (3.2)
From the above equation it can be seen that the larger the difference between two
advertisers’ place, the smaller the link parameter they have. Table 3.1 gives us the
four advertisers’ ranking places changes from February 28th to March 18th. The
difference of these ranking places goes up and down in these days. From Asus’s
point of view, we observe some interesting values. The largest difference between
Asus and Apple happened on Feb 28th. During the week of March 11th to 16th, there
is only one difference in the ranking place between Asus and Apple. This decrease
in difference and ranking place results in an increase in the link parameter between
Asus and Apple according to Equation (3.2), denting an increase in influence of the
two advertisers to each other.
3.3 Simulation Results
Let us assume that the budget allocation runs for one cycle from the 1st stage to the
3rd stage. In this section, we now perform a set of Matlab simulations of an example online
advertising ecosystem of 160 users and 4 advertisers using the data crawled in Section 3.2
under RM dynamics based on the definition of all the parameters we mentioned in Section
3.2.2. The evolution of users’ and advertisers’ evolutionary percentage allocation is shown
for each stage. Further discussion and analysis are also given.
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PPPPPPPPPDate
Ri Asus Samsung Apple Kindle
Feb 28th 5 1 34 3
Mar 1st 10 1 39 3
Mar 2nd 9 1 36 2
Mar 3rd 5 2 22 3
Mar 4th 7 2 9 3
Mar 5th 5 7 3 4
Mar 6th 3 6 2 4
Mar 7th 3 8 2 5
Mar 8th 4 9 3 6
Mar 9th 5 7 4 6
Mar 10th 7 4 6 5
Mar 11th 3 1 2 5
Mar 12th 3 1 2 4
Mar 13th 3 1 2 4
Mar 14th 3 1 2 4
Mar 15th 3 1 2 5
Mar 16th 2 1 3 4
Mar 17th 2 1 4 6
Mar 18th 3 1 5 6
Table 3.1: Ranking places for each advertiser during time period Feb 28th-March 18th.
3.3.1 The First Stage
Let us assume the first stage is the initial stage for all the advertisers. The sequence
of ranking places is bid by advertisers with limited information about their competitors, i.e.,
other advertisers, and advertisers obtain their initial ranking places after a bidding auction.
Apple has been ranked as the lowest with 34th ranking place with Asus in the 5th place
and Kindle in the 3rd place. Samsung obtained the top ranking place at the beginning.
We assume that a better position (higher ranking place) corresponds to an increased ability
to affect more users, resulting in the potential for a larger sales volume. However, each
advertiser needs to determine how to rationally use its budget to maximize profits based on
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its own brand and product.
3.3.1.1 Simulation Result
According to the initial order of the ranking places, the initial budget allocation for
Asus, Apple, Samsung and Kindle are deliberately chosen as y1(0)= [0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2]T,
y2(0) = [0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4]T, y3(0) = [0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1]T, and y4(0) = [0.2 0.4
0.3 0.1]T respectively. Every advertiser allocates its money according to its current ad-
vertising strategy. That is to say, Asus allocates most of its budget to the third best ranking
place, Apple allocates most of its budget to the fourth best ranking place at the outset, Sam-
sung initially choose the first best ranking place, and Kindle allocates more budgets to the
second best ranking place. The preference matrix of each advertiser for each ranking place
is set as follows:
Ā1 =

1.0 0.5 2.5 4.5
4.5 1.0 4.5 4.5
9.0 9.0 1.0 9.0




1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
0.5 1.0 2.5 4.5
0.5 2.5 1.0 2.5





1.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5
2.5 0.5 1.0 4.5




1.0 4.5 4.5 4.5
4.5 1.0 4.5 4.5
4.5 4.5 1.0 4.5
4.5 4.5 4.5 1.0

,
Since ā131 = 9.0, ā
1
32 = 9.0 and ā
1
34 = 9.0, this indicates that advertiser Asus’s first bidding
target is the third best ranking place. Similarly, we know from Ā4 that Kindle has equal














































































































Figure 3.16: First Stage: Allocation ratio of advertisers Asus, Apple, Samsung and Kindle
to the advertisement places.
The evolution of budget allocation, as determined by our model, is shown in Figure
3.16. It is obvious to see that the sequence of ranking places from the highest to lowest
are: Samsung, Kindle, Asus and Apple. Additionally, Figure 3.17 shows the predicted
evolution of users’ allocation percentages to 4 advertisers. There is a diverse number of
users that have a preference to a certain advertiser. We get this data from real eBay users
and normalize it for our dynamics. Samsung, the advertiser who obtains the best ranking
place, is chosen by 57 users. Meanwhile, Apple has the lowest ranking place and is chosen
by 19 users due to its worst ranking place. At the same time, 38 users have chosen Asus
and 46 uses have chosen Kindle. The results are consistent with sale’s percentage in the







































































































Figure 3.17: First Stage: Allocation ratio of 160 users to the 4 advertisers.
3.3.2 The Second Stage
The second stage is the modification period for all advertisers to adjust their strate-
gies for a better sales volume. Advertisers such as Apple especially need to reallocate its
budget to compete with other advertisers. During this stage, Apple strives to achieve the
best ranking place. Asus also has the same target as Apple. At the same time, Samsung, the
advertiser that has spent a large amount of budget in the first stage tries to adjust strategy
to maximize profits with a minimal amount of investment.
3.3.2.1 Simulation Result
Using the final state allocation of the first stage, the initial budget allocation of
the second stage is deliberately chosen as y1(0) = [0.12 0.23 0.61 0.04]T, y2(0) =
[0.07 0.18 0.16 0.59]T, y3(0) = [0.67 0.06 0.23 0.04]T, and y4(0) = [0.28 0.3
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0.3 0.12]T. As mentioned above, each of the advertisers has to change their marketing
strategy to reach a new target in the next stage. The new preference matrix of advertisers
for each ranking place is set as follows:
Ā1 =

1.0 2.5 2.5 4.5
4.5 1.0 4.5 4.5
9.0 9.0 1.0 9.0




1.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
4.5 1.0 4.5 4.5
0.5 2.5 1.0 2.5





1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
0.5 9.0 9.0 9.0
2.5 2.5 1.0 4.5




1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
2.5 1.0 2.5 2.5
4.5 4.5 1.0 4.5
9.0 9.0 9.0 1.0

,
We also increase advertisers’ mutation parameters from range 0.05–0.01 to range 0.1–0.5,
which implies the advertisers are more willing to change ranking places during the modifi-
cation period. During the second stage, every advertiser struggles to use a suitable strategy
to achieve its new target. Figure 3.18 shows the changing ranking places during the second
stage, as determined by our model. The new sequence of ranking places from the highest
to lowest are: Apple, Asus, Kindle and Samsung. Corresponding to the changing of ad-
vertisers’ ranking places, users still prefer the advertisers who take over the best ranking
place. Therefore, more and more users start to allocate their money to Apple instead of
Samsung. Figure 3.19 shows the resulting evolution of users’ allocation percentage to the
4 advertisers during second stage. The number of users chose Asus, Apple, Samsung and
Kindle are separately 46, 98, 11, and 15. There are 27 users prompt to increase their alloca-














































































































Figure 3.18: Second Stage: Allocation ratio of advertisers Asus, Apple, Samsung and



































































































higher ranking place Decreasing when
Sumsung falls to a
lower ranking place
Figure 3.19: Second Stage: Allocation ratio of 160 users to the 4 advertisers.
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the same problem of decreasing user allocation percentage as Samsung when its ranking
place falls behind.
3.3.3 The Third Stage
After a furious competition in the second stage, advertisers not only get a better
understanding about their own products in this certain market, but they also have more
detailed information about other advertisers. Under this circumstance, they adjust their
strategies based on the current budget and sales volume. We assume that all the advertisers
hold the same amount of budget. Thus, this is the final stage for all the advertisers to hold
the better ranking places. These transfer to be the initial ranking places in next cycle.
3.3.3.1 Simulation Result
Using the final state allocation of each advertiser in the second stage, their initial
budget allocation of the third stage is deliberately chosen as y1(0)= [0.10 0.69 0.14 0.07]T,
y2(0)= [0.57 0.33 0.06 0.04]T and x3(0)= [0.08 0.18 0.20 0.54]T, y4(0)= [0.08
0.30 0.55 0.07]T. Each of the advertisers changes its marketing strategy again to finally




1.0 2.5 2.5 4.5
4.5 1.0 4.5 4.5
9.0 9.0 1.0 9.0




1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
9.0 1.0 9.0 9.0
4.5 4.5 1.0 4.5






1.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
2.5 2.5 2.5 9.0
2.5 2.5 1.0 4.5




1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
2.5 1.0 2.5 2.5
4.5 4.5 1.0 4.5
9.0 9.0 9.0 1.0

.
Figure 3.20 shows the evolution of advertisers’ final percentage allocation. The final se-
quence of ranking places from the highest to lowest are: Samsung, Apple, Asus and Kindle.
Figure 3.21 is the percentage allocation of users to the 4 advertisers. It is clear from Table
3.1 that ranking places of all the advertisers are close. The results in Figure 3.21 tell the
same story, that users’ different allocation between these four advertisers. According to the
Matlab simulation results, there are 41 users have chosen Asus, 23 users have chosen Ap-
ple, 75 users have chosen Samsung and 21 users have chosen Kindle. The users’ allocation













































































































Figure 3.20: Third Stage: Allocation ratio of advertisers Asus, Apple, Samsung and Kindle




































































































Figure 3.21: Third Stage: Allocation ratio of 160 users to the 4 advertisers.
Further discussion will be presented in the following chapter. Online advertise-
ment’s strategy design about each advertiser will also be highlighted.
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Chapter 4
Design of Advertising Strategy
In the global, digital and rapidly-growing Internet market, great changes have emerged
in the aspects of market property, space and time concepts, consumer demands and behav-
ior etc. Marketing represents the relationship between the ranking place (market location)
and the advertiser. Knowledge of current and emerging happenings in the ranking place is
extremely important in any strategic planning exercise. The role of marketing strategy is
the creation of a unique and valuable position, which deals with developing, implementing,
and directing companies to achieve designated intentions. This chapter discusses different
aspects of marketing strategies based on the crawled data in Chapter 3. Furthermore, this
chapter discusses budget management and positioning of local users using two highlighted
examples.
Indeed, marketing strategy is the most significant challenge that advertisers of all
types and sizes have to face. Within a given environment, marketing strategy deals essen-
tially with the three forces known as the strategic three Cs [26]: the user (the customer),






Figure 4.1: Key agents of marketing strategy formulation
The user, competition, and advertiser in Figure 4.1 are considered as being dynamic,
living creatures with their own objectives to pursue. If what the user wants do not match
the needs of the advertiser, the latter’s long-term viability may be at stake. Good match-
ing of the needs and objectives of users and advertisers is required for a lasting positive
relationship. That is to say, it is imperative for the advertiser to develop adaptive online
marketing strategies and establish a good relationship with users. The advertiser should
exert its strategies from the following aspects in [40]: product strategies, price strategies,
distribution strategies and promotion strategies.
• Product Strategies. Product is the good provided by the advertiser to the online
market that satisfies a user’s need. Strictly speaking, all products are suitable for sale
online. However, different products require different strategies and must take into
account a user’s psychology and logistics factors. For some products, such as audio-
visual products or furniture, users can experience the function online personally. It
is easy for a user to make a final purchase decision. For some other products, such
as clothes or electronics, users can only read the describing text and pictures online
instead of the feelings. Users may need time to analyze products and may somethings
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struggle to make a final decision. To achieve a better sale, these products should exert
online promotion, and adopt express delivery service to send merchandise to users.
As pointed out in [14], the Internet leads to a faster discovery of customer needs,
greater customization of products to the customers’ needs, faster product testing, and
shorter product life cycles.
• Price Strategies. The Internet produces an increasing standardization of prices
across borders, or at least narrowing price differentials as users become more aware
of prices in different countries [34]. The convenience of searching online makes it
easier for users to swap between advertisers. It is expected that the bargaining skill of
users are likely to increase by becoming aware of alternative products elsewhere. In
response, advertisers can adopt flexible pricing strategies according to product cost
and the supply-demand relationship. Example strategies include free shipping price
strategy, auction price strategy, try-using strategy, etc.
• Personalization Strategies. Online shopping without geographical constraints pro-
vides more options for users. Users can seek satisfactory goods in a global scope
in accordance with their individual personality and demands. Dissimilar to decades
before only the rich can enjoy the personalized customization, normal users have to
choose demands according to their income, status, family grades etc. More and more
users start to personalize themselves while making a purchase. They place emphasis
on the values of the products and their consumption concept tends to be more ratio-
nal. Therefore, advertisers should focus marketing ideas on the demands of users and
their personalized demands as the starting point to provide more desirable products
and services.
• Promotion Strategies. Promotion refers to the various ways an advertiser can com-
municate its products’ merits and persuade targeted users to purchase its products.
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Generally, there are two classic ways of online advertising [25]. One is to attract
users through advertisements in a website where users can click while browsing; the
other way is to send advertisements through emails. At the same time, advertisers’
webpages are the key to promotional strategies. By visiting the website, users can
access more detailed information about the products, give feedback, and of course,
purchase products. Advertisers should adopt suitable measures to intensify com-
munication with the public and make corresponding adjustments according to the
feedback.
4.1 Cases Discussion
Two example online advertising strategies will be explained in this section. These
two examples are the brands Apple and Samsung, which come from the Chapter 3. We will
extend the analysis of their evolution and give specific explanation about their strategies at
each step.
4.1.1 Advertiser: Apple
As we know, Apple is a technological company which emphasizes the uniqueness
and perfection of their products. This tenet brings Apple increasingly loyal fans from the
first Apple products. Overtime these people have associated Apple’s products with personal
identification. According to the latest U.S. tablet customer satisfaction survey conducted by
J.D. Power, a global marketing information services company [9], Apple has earned a 5-star
rating and scored 830 on a 1,000 point scale, edging out Samsung, which scored a second
place at 822 [11]. A good reputation is an invisible and effective advertisement, which is
not easily forgotten by people. It is the reason why Apple chose the 34th ranking places
at the beginning of first stage. Under the assumption of equal budget, Apple first tried to
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obtain the maximum economic benefits of its reputation while minimizing expenses.
For this study, we assume that the list of products provided to users are those re-
turned products after typing the keyword “tablet” in Ebay’s search engine. All advertisers
know their rank after the first round of bidding, as well as their sales volume per day. Ap-
ple falls to 36th place on March 2nd with one product selling per day. We also assume all
the strategies used by advertisers here follow the contract between advertisers and the pub-
lisher. Apparently, higher ranking place needs be acquired to attract more users to Apple at
this time. A large investment is redistributed on March 2nd to gain a higher ranking place.
From Figure 3.14, sales volume soars from 693 to 1051 between March 2nd and March
5th. However, other advertisers also readjust their distribution based on their sales volume
and other requirements. During the first stage, Apple is the only advertiser whose sales
volume is over 100.
When approaching the 2nd stage, Apple has already reached the best ranking place
among all advertisers. The sales volume is still increasing rapidly before March 7th. We
can see its ranking place changing during this period in Fig 3.13. It has almost the same
changing rate as advertiser Asus. Now, it is the best time for Apple to shrink its investment
and save budget with the best ranking place holding currently.
We assume that the contracts between advertisers and publisher are time-bound,
i.e., the conditions of the contract can be fixed several times within a period of validity.
With a limited budget left, the 3rd stage is the last time for all advertisers to increase sales
volume and attract more users. From Figure 3.13, Apple depletes its budget to compete
with other advertisers for a better ranking place. With the largest sales volume during the
first three stages, Apple turns a profit much earlier than expected. It is the reason Apple
wants to hold a better ranking place for the next bidding around.
In conclusion, Apple’s strategy changes can be divided into three parts: (1) Conser-




It seems redundant for us to point out that Samsung is quickly gaining on Apple
in terms of brand affection. The signs that Samsung, which has been investing heavily
in brand loyalty is now challenging Apple in this crucial area of marketing, are revealed
as analysts look across a wider range of social media and psychometric levels in [8]. A
single reason that Samsung is gaining on Apple in brand affection then it lies in Samsung’s
substantial investment in social engagement, an area Apple eschews. At the same time,
Samsung cares more on sales volume at multiple price points. It is known as the second
“Nokia” in the recent five years with blockbuster sales at relatively lower price for its
products. It might be one of the reasons why Samsung achieves the best ranking place
after the initial bidding. Meanwhile, Samsung holds the largest initial basic sales volume
at 957, which might be the result from last bidding cycle.
By taking a look at the first stage in Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14, we can find that
even with the 1st ranking place, the increase of sales volume of Samsung is very slow. This
situation could be caused by two reasons: (1) Similar products in the immediate ranking
places and (2) a relatively lower rate of the products due to the huge sales. In this case,
Samsung needs to shrink its budget for the best ranking place in order to avoid useless
investment. Thus, a falling process can be found from March 4th.
The sales volume we crawled for Samsung from March 4th to March 7th increases
consistently at 5 per day. However, a slight reduction in sales volume can be observed on
March 8th. If Samsung does not change strategy, its ranking place will continue to fall
with decreasing sales volume. On March 9th, Samsung changes strategy by placing more
money for a better rank to help itself return to its initial ranking place. Sales volume then
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dramatically increases from March 9th to March 12th and steadily increases during the
third stage with sales volume from 1035 to 1055.
Overall, there are three features of Samsung’s strategies. Firstly, it invests heavily
at the beginning for the best ranking place. This strategy focuses more on attracting users
rather than reaching huge sales volumes. Secondly, its investment outflows in a planned
way, which keeps its ranking place floating in the range of first ten. This strategy help
Samsung prepare the final bidding effectively. The last is the readjustment just as Apple.
4.2 Strategy Design
In this section, strategy design for increasing online sales and user data collection
are proposed. Firstly, the common online strategies of budget management are applied to
two examples. Secondly, another two examples are introduced to look for a better targeting
method.
4.2.1 Case Study
From the above two example, we can observe that several interesting points of ad-
vertisers’ strategy in the online advertising ecosystem. First, the role of the initial ranking
places in the first stage is significant. Each initial ranking place leads to different evolu-
tionary locus. Similarly, each advertiser has its own purpose for different initial ranking
place. Furthermore, a rapid increase of ranking place leads to a distinct jump in sales vol-
ume, which has a stronger effect than holding the best ranking place the entire time. This
result is only hold in our work due to the similar advertisers we chose for simplicity. After
knowing the strategies of other competitors for a short while, the important thing for each
advertiser turns out to be strategic adjustment at appropriate times. The strategy design for
budget management is introduced in the following parts.
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Because the product we chose for data crawl is a tablet, its product strategies are
implemented easily online. Users can make a quick choice after they browse each product’s
function. The price of all the products we have chosen is below 500 dollars; the price of
Asus, Samsung, Apple and Kindle are respectively $159.99, $169.99, $439.99, $199.99.
For simplicity and veracity of simulation results, we assume that their price does not change
during the whole process. However, when we come to the personalization strategies, ad-
vertiser Apple creates a new category for their user. On the contrary, advertiser Asus and
Samsung lack the marketing ideas to satisfy users’ personalized demands.
We assume that each bidding period is divided into three stages as in Figure 3.13.
Stage 4 then becomes Stage 1 in the next bidding period. To achieve a huge sales volume,
advertisers need rational budget management. Advertiser such as Apple can first choose a
relatively lower ranking place close to 25-35, approximately 15-20 percent of its budget.
Then is should try its best to compete for the best ranking place with others after becoming
familiar with users. The sales volume is big enough, which should already fit the sales
target. In the last round, Apple uses the remaining part of its budget, which is around 20-30
percent, to bid for a better ranking place for the next period. However, advertiser Samsung
who uses promotion strategy would like to distribute 35-45 percent of its budget in the first
stage. Although it reduces the budget for the second stage, it still struggles for a higher
ranking place by using the entire budget during the last stage. Other advertisers without
obvious purpose can distribute their budget equally at each stage.
4.2.2 Examples
In this section, two examples of user targeting are presented. IP-based geo-targeting,
search targeting, explicit profile data targeting, behavioral targeting and contextual target-
ing are explored with each example.
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4.2.2.1 Online Sales Increase
RadioShack is seeking to increase the online sale of electronics using a promotion
on Memorial Day. The promotion is for the prize of an iPhone accessory based on users
voting for their favorite products. Apple is sponsoring the promotion alongside regional
sponsorships by local electronic stores. Information gathered at contest registration will
include e-mail, birthday, gender, and numbers of purchase in physical shop, favorite brand,
and address.
− IP-based Geo-Targeting: IP targeting will be done to ensure coverage of outlying
markets such as suburban and rural areas.
− Search Targeting: Search targeting will be used to capture users that may be inter-
ested in purchasing iPhone product. Key words such as “iPhone” “Ballistic Cases”
and other descriptions will be used. In addition, words related to the contest such as
“accessories” “16GB” and “Apple” will be used.
− Explicit Profile Data Targeting: RadioShack has an e-mail list of users containing
their past purchase and demographic information. This information is deemed ad-
missible because it is supplied by the users themselves. The list has been actively
maintained and is considered fresh. Special e-mails will be sent to users who are
Apple fans and who have indicated they have purchased a similar product in the last
six months. The mailing list will be divided by gender and have different subject
lines and content for females and for males.
− Behavioral Targeting: RadioShack will use behavioral targeting, which collects in-
formation on a user’s web browsing actions, usually through the use of “cookies”,
to track all visitors accessing to the power tools section of their Website. Informa-
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tion gathered on the user’s footprint will be used to refine the targeting of display
advertisements and to better place new advertisements online.
− Contextual Targeting: RadioShack will place a series of online display advertise-
ments for the contest on specific electronic web sites such as BestBuy and Newegg
(newegg.com). These advertisements will be placed in the areas associated with mo-
bile accessories and other electronics.
4.2.2.2 Localization and User Profile Data Collection
RadioShack is looking to continue to evolve a very strong national brand, and to
remind users that radioShack is a convenient electronic shop in their neighborhood. They
want users to know their products so that they can understand users’ needs and deliver
better customer service, in-stock inventory, and a friendly shopping environment.
− IP-based Geo-Targeting: IP-based geo-targeting can be used to get blanket cover-
age of users. For larger direct market access (DMAs), they can improve on reach-
ing more specific users by combining IP-based geo-targeting with other targeting
methodologies below.
− Search Targeting: RadioShack can tailor advertisement messaging to users depend-
ing on their local search criteria. For example, RadioShack can target advertisement
creative highlighting all the different electronic brands they carry at the local Ra-
dioShack to users searching for open houses in Seneca, SC.
− Explicit Profile Data RadioShack can target users on Facebook based on where
they’ve indicated they live. Similar to sending marketing by post mail, RadioShack
can show users’ advertisements with local messaging based on where a user lives.
This data is typically very accurate. Therefore, an effective creative that would res-
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onate with the user could be an ad that shows the location of the nearest RadioShack
with a friendly face.
− Behavioral Targeting: This is slightly less accurate than Explicit Profile data tar-
geting but has a broader reach. RadioShack can create a more generalized message
based on things the user loves. For example, RadioShack can have advertisements
showing tiger logo products in Auburn, AL, and a similar creative for users in Clem-
son, SC.
− Contextual Targeting RadioShack can tailor messaging based on the local content
of the site. For instance, the advertisement of RadioShack near Clemson focuses




Replicator-mutator dynamics are widely used in multi-agents network to mimic the
agent’s evolutionary state based on its own decision and environmental effects. In order to
obtain the agents’ motion and design suitable strategies for online advertising, we borrow
this dynamics into our work. The thesis proposes an analytical framework to model and
analyze a large-scale complex online advertising ecosystem. We found a lot of similarities
shared by the online advertisement ecosystem and real biological systems. Those similari-
ties not only work on the agents’ characteristics, but also contribute to the entire ecosystem.
Each major parameter plays a vital role in our replicator-mutator dynamics. Meanwhile,
they have crucial effects on the stability of online advertising ecosystem. Furthermore, we
provide system-level performance analysis based on the analytical framework. Strategies
are changed with every online advertisement bidding circle. By applying the replicator-
mutator dynamics, users’ and advertisers’ influence to each other, even to the whole sys-
tem, can be analyzed. More specifically, the conclusion and contribution of each chapter
are summarized below.
In chapter 2, fundamental scenario of online advertising ecosystem comes up first
to illustrate the research background. Both users’ and advertisers’ replicator-mutator dy-
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namics are fully introduced. Their evolutionary states depend on each other. Both the
experimental observations and simulated results confirmed the variation of four major pa-
rameters in replicator-mutator dynamics build unique contributes to the ecosystem sepa-
rately. These parameters are hierarchy parameter, preference matrix, initial condition and
mutation parameter, respectively. Additionally, dynamics of different relationship between
users and advertisers are introduced to simulate the online advertising ecosystem. It is
shown that only the full version of replicator-mutator dynamics can fit and express our re-
search problem. Experimental results, such as the sale volume and the number of users
both increased with the raising ranking places of advertisers, have been demonstrated by
our Matlab simulation result.
In Chapter 3, real data of online retailers are crawled and used to formulate our
replicator-mutator dynamics. Major data of each parameter are used to validate our model,
which also shed light on the design strategies. The data crawled can be divided into four
stages which compose a recycling circle of ecosystem. The simulation we conducted at
each stage exactly reflects the advertisers’ evolution in the online advertising ecosystem.
Some interesting strategies and targeting design can be obtained by analyzing from our
simulation. These strategies enable a fast-processing and precise targeting operation for
advertisers and users.
In Chapter 4, the major strategies of each stage are explained, based on a variety of
scenarios that advertisers may face in the online advertising ecosystem. Furthermore, two
examples are respectively highlighted to give more specific details of budget management
and local targeting users.
To conclude, the replicator-mutator dynamics offer a rigorous analytical method to
describe the dynamics of complex adaptive systems. A future goal will be designing new
self-regulation strategies that eventually minimize the advertisement budget by managing
the advertising properties. To fulfill this need, a feedback controller about advertisers’
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strategies to certain users would be the future interesting aspect.
On the other hand, users’ behaviors need to be fully studied in regard to the adver-
tisers’ strategies and marketing interactions, as these customized ways of marketing may
play an important role in online searching and purchasing operations. Relationship between
users and advertisers has been verified in the agents’ behaviors and marketing properties;
hence, future work is to develop a numerical analysis model that integrates advertisers’ crit-
ical stage with users’ variation feedback and response into a feedback control mechanism.
The integration of market economics and optimal control methods may provide a possible





Appendix A The evolution of advertiser sv ’s allocated resources in time by equa-
tion (2.27) guarantees the assumption that the total resources of user sv equal to 1. i.e.,
cT yv(t) = 1 for all v = 1,2, · · · ,N given initial condition cT yv(0) = 1.
Proof. Mutiply cT for both sides of Equation (2.27) to get





γvlξvlcT yv(t)−β v(t)cT yv(t).
As cT [Pv(t)]T = cT and cT yv(0) = 1, it becomes to





γvlξvlcT yv(t)−β v(t)cT yv(t).
By the definition of average fitness θ v(t) = hv(t)T yv(t) =∑Mi=1 yvi (t)h
v
i (t) in Equation (2.19)
and total capacity β v(t) = ∑Ml=1 γvlξvl in Equation (2.25), we can get




γvlξvl−β v(t) = 0.
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Appendix B The evolution of user ru ’s allocated resources in time by Equation
(2.5) guarantees the assumption that the total resources of user ru equal to 1. i.e., cT xu(t) =
1 for all u = 1,2, · · · ,n given initial condition cT xu(0) = 1.
Proof. Mutiply cT for both sides of Equation (2.5) to get











As cT [Qu(t)]T = cT and cT xu(0) = 1, it becomes to






















cT ẋu(t) = 0
83






global n N M Ap1 Ap2 Q_ap Fs As_a
global Q_ap1 Ap3 Ap4 Fu Au_a Ap5 Ap6
StarNetPaper1



















if k==1; Ak=Ap1; % Preference parameter of each user
else Ak=Ap2;
end
Dk=sum(Ak,2); % sum by rows
L=eye(N)-Ak.*repmat(1./Dk, 1,N);











Dg=sum(Ag,2); % sum by rows
R=eye(M)-Ag.*repmat(1./Dg, 1,M);
































global N M Q_ap1 Fu Au_a Ap3 Ap4
global n Ap1 Ap2 Q_ap Fs As_a
dy1=zeros(n*N+N*M,1);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% dy(1)= User’s dynamics %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
for k=1:n
if k==1; Ak=Ap1;
else Ak=Ap2; % Preference parameter
end
xk=y(1+(k-1)*N:N+(k-1)*N);
fk=Ak*xk; % fitness parameter





%% User’s social interaction
% As and Fs defined in main code
% As_a=ones(n,n)-eye(n,n);
% interaction matrix - defined in main code
Ws=As_a./repmat(sum(As_a,2),1,n);
% weighted matrix
Fs=[1:1:n]’; %defined in main code
FiS =(sum(repmat(Fs’,n,1).*Ws,2));
% interaction fitness








term11=(sum(Q_ap.*F,1))’; % Q’*F*y - Islam











% end term 13
%% obtain the 4th term
% FiS4 - in the above loop
term14= FiS4.*y(1:n*N);
% end term 4
dy1(1:n*N) = term11 -Phi_a.*y(1:n*N)+term13-term14;












%% advertiser’s social interaction
% As and Fu defined in main code
% Au_a=ones(n,n)-eye(n,n);
% interaction matrix - defined in main code
Wu=Au_a./repmat(sum(Au_a,2),1,N);
Fu=[1:1:n]’; defined in main code
FiU =(sum(repmat(Fu’,N,1).*Wu,2));









% Q’*F*z - Islam
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% end term1
%% obtain the 24th term
% FiU4 - in the above loop
term24= FiU4.*y(n*N+1:n*N+N*M);


















%% Users choose different advertisers;
Ap1=rand(N,N);
















%Preference would be 3>1>2;
%% Advertisers choose different ranking places;
Ap3=rand(N,N);
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